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Based on data from a panel of the Swedish municipalities during 1993-
2004, the eﬀects of public health care expenditure on absence from work
due to sickness or disability were studied using an instrumental variable
method. Public health care expenditure had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on ab-
sence due to sickness or disability and the standard errors were small
enough to rule out all but a minimal eﬀect. The same result was obtained
when separate estimates were done for men and women and for absence
due to sickness and disability.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Rising health care costs in most industrialized countries have increased the
importance of evaluating the eﬀects of health care expenditure. In the past few
decades, assessing its eﬀects on health outcomes has become a central question in
the context of health care cost containment in most developed countries (Nixon
and Ulmann, 2006). From a Swedish perspective it is especially interesting
to estimate the relationship between health care expenditure and absenteeism,
since according to OECD (2005) “Sweden’s single biggest economic problem is
the high number of people absent from work due to sickness or disability”.1
The eﬀects of health care programs on the absence of speciﬁc patient groups
have been studied previously.2 However, to my knowledge, the eﬀect of aggre-
gated health care expenditure on absence has never been studied. The purpose
of the present study was to estimate how aggregated public expenditure on
health care aﬀects absence from work due to sickness or disability.
The literature on absence includes estimations of the eﬀects of individuals’
health status: Paringer (1983) found perceived health status to be an important
predictor of hours lost from work, which was supported by Primoﬀ Vistnes
(1997), who also reported statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of obesity and smoking
on the likelihood for women’s absence. The literature also provides massive
support for that economic incentives aﬀect absence, for example the following
four studies using Swedish data; Johansson and Brännäs (1998), Johansson and
Palme (2002, 2005) and Henrekson and Persson (2004).3
Whether increased aggregated expenditure on health care or increased access
to health care actually improves the health status of the population in indus-
trialized countries is still an open question. Higher expenditure on health care
could lead to better health among the population by reducing waiting times for
medical care or improving procedures. But according to Nixon and Ulmann’s
(2006) review of the literature on health care expenditures and health outcomes,
cross-country studies have found limited or no relationship between health care
expenditure and mortality rates. On the other hand, Crémieux et al. (1999)
1According to Statistics Sweden and The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 5.2 percent of
employee working hours in Sweden were lost due to sickness absence in 2004; at the same time
8.1 percent of the population aged 16 to 64 were on disability pension.
2Absence will be used throughout this paper to mean absence from work due to either
sickness or disability.
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found that higher health care expenditure among Canadian provinces reduced
male and female infant mortality and increased life expectancy. They explained
the diﬀerent results by the inherent heterogeneity associated with cross-country
studies. Lichtenberg (2004) analyzed time-series of life expectancy in the United
States and found that both public health care expenditure and research and de-
velopment expenditure on pharmaceuticals had positive eﬀects. Aakvik and
Holmås (2006) found no eﬀect of the total number of general practitioners per
capita on mortality rates in Norwegian municipalities, but found a negative
eﬀect of the number of contracted general practitioners. Brook et al. (1983)
reported on the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, a controlled trial in the
United States where families were randomly assigned insurance plans. One
group received all their medical care free of charge and, as a consequence, used
more than the other groups. Despite this, the only statistically signiﬁcant ef-
fects were improvements in health for those with poor vision and for low-income
persons with high blood pressure. However, the study included only people aged
14 to 61 who were free of disability that precluded work.
Except for the rare occasions when a randomized controlled trial is pre-
formed, determining the eﬀect of health care expenditure and access to health
care is complicated by the context in which decisions regarding health care are
taken. Health care expenditure is partly determined by the perceived need for
it, which in turn may be aﬀected by absence. Therefore an instrumental vari-
able estimator was used in this study in an attempt to determine the causal link
between health care expenditure and absence.
Most previous studies have evaluated the eﬀect of health care expenditure
on mortality rates and life expectancy. Therefore, this paper contributes to
t h el i t e r a t u r eb ye x a m i n i n gt h ee ﬀect on absence due to sickness or disability,
which can be expected to be correlated with individuals’ health related quality
of life. The analysis was based on municipality-level data from Sweden. As
demonstrated by Granlund (2007), the results may also help determining the
sign of a vertical ﬁscal externality that arises when a lower level of government
provides health care, the central government provides a sickness beneﬁta n d
both levels tax labor income. Health care is more likely to be over-provided by
the local governments the smaller eﬀect health care expenditure has on absence.
The article also explains why the lower level of government has a weak incentive
to reduce absence. In practice, this may result in a relatively small share ofThe Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 3
total health care expenditure being focused on reducing absence in a country
like Sweden. The results from research in this ﬁeld may also inform policy
makers in their decision regarding the level of expenditure on health care. The
main ﬁnding in this paper is that health care expenditure had no statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on absence and that, under all circumstances, the possible eﬀect
was small.
The next section outlines the theory, while section 3 presents the empirical
analysis. The data are discussed in section 3.1 and the empirical speciﬁcation
in section 3.2, while section 3.3 contains the results. Finally, in section 4 the
paper’s conclusions are presented.
2 Theoretical outline
To later be able to specify the empirical model, we need an absence function for
municipalities which includes the health status of the population as well as a
health production function. To derive the ﬁrst of these, we ﬁrst have to analyze
what determines whether individuals will prefer to be absent from work.
An individual’s instantaneous utility can be expressed as ut = u(ct) −
f(ht,j t)−g(si,t−1,s −i,t−1),w h e r ect is consumption at time t;e ﬀort (f)d e p e n d s
on health status (ht) and work conditions (jt); and the disutility of absence (−g)
depends on one’s own prior period absence (si,t−1) and that of others (s−i,t−1).
It is assumed that eﬀort decreases with good health and work conditions, while
the disutility of absence decreases with both one’s own and others’ prior pe-
riod absence. This represents internal habit formation, that one might be more
likely to be absent this period for a given health and other variables if one was
absent the last period, and external habit formation, that high previous absence
of others in one’s surroundings might reduce the social cost of current absence.
Naturally, for absent individuals the eﬀort is zero and for those working the
disutility of absence is zero.
For simplicity let’s assume that individuals have no access to capital markets
and only choose whether to work or be absent. When an individual works
ct = wt(1−τt),w h e r ew is labor income and τ is the tax rate on labor income.
For individuals absent from work ct = Bt(1−τt),w h e r eB is a sickness beneﬁt.
Assuming myopic behavior, i.e. that individuals neglect the eﬀect of currentThe Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 4
absence on their future utility, individual’s will prefer to be absent if
u(Bt(1 − τt)) − g(si,t−1,s −i,t−1) >u (wt(1 − τt)) − f(ht,j t).( 1 )
Medical doctors and sickness insurance oﬃcials are usually involved in de-
ciding whether a sickness beneﬁt will be allowed. According to the Swedish
regulations during the study-period, individuals were entitled to sickness bene-
ﬁts if their capacity to work was suﬃciently reduced due to poor health and a
doctor’s certiﬁcate was usually required for sick leave extending one week.4 For
long-term sick leave, the capacity to perform other assignments would also be
taken into consideration.5 Nevertheless, also the variables B, τ, si,t−1, s−i,t−1
and w can be expected to aﬀect absence. First, since doctors and insurance
oﬃcials cannot observe ability to work perfectly, they must rely in part on in-
formation provided by the individual, which may be aﬀected by the individual’s
incentives. Second, doctors may also consider what their patients prefer, and
while insurance oﬃcials can deny sickness beneﬁts to individuals with a doc-
tor’s certiﬁcate, they mostly follow the doctor’s recommendation.6 The absence
function for municipalities can therefore be written
st = s(Bt(1 − τt),wt(1 − τt),st−1,jt,ht),( 2 )
where B,τ,w,s,j,h are in bold to indicate that they describe the situation for
all individuals of working age in a municipality.
The aggregated health status in a municipality at period t can be written
ht=h(ht−1,et,rt,Xt),( 3 )
where e is public health care expenditure per capita; r represents the health
risks that individuals are exposed to, for example at their workplaces; and X
denotes demographic characteristics, like age and gender.
4Since October 1, 1995, a doctor’s certiﬁcate has been required to receive beneﬁts after
the seventh calendar day of absence. Before that, the Swedish Social Insurance Agency could
require a doctor’s certiﬁcate for sick leave lasting over four weeks, and also earlier in some
cases (Proposition 1994/95:147 and Law 1995:508).
5In certain circumstances, also the individual’s age and education etc. were allowed to
inﬂuence the judgment regarding capacity to work (Law 1996:1543).
6Shortell (1998) discusses physicians multiple accountabilities. Based on a survey of 4,200
physicians active in Sweden (response rate 58 percent), Arrelöv (2006) similarly reports that
65 percent of physicians consider the patient’s motivation for returning to work when assessing
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3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data description
The present study was based on yearly municipality-level data on absence for
the period 1993 to 2004. There were 286 municipalities in 1993, yielding 3,432
observations.7 Data on public health care expenditure are primarily available
at county level, where responsibility for health care provision lies. There were
23 counties in 1993, shrinking to 20 in 2004. In addition there were three
municipalities (Malmö, Göteborg and Gotland) which did not belong to any
county but provided health care themselves in 1993. By 2004 only Gotland
remained in this category.
Table 1 (below) gives descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study
while Table A1 in Appendix A deﬁnes them and gives data sources. Figure 1 and
2 (also in Appendix A) provide box plots for two of the most central variables
in this study. The ﬁrst six variables describe absence from work and cover
all employees and self-employed in Sweden, since they were all automatically
i n s u r e di nt h es o c i a li n s u r a n c es y s t e m .Sickness is the average number of days
of absence from work due to sickness during a year for insured individuals in the
ages of 16 to 64. Disability and Rehab are the corresponding numbers of days
on disability/early retirement pension and days of absence due to rehabilitation,
respectively, and absence, s, is the sum of these three variables. The original
absence data lacked information for some observations and did not include days
compensated by employers, which over the study-period changed between the
ﬁrst 14, 21, and 28 days of each absence spell. In Appendix B it is described
how data from other sources were used to adjust the absence variables to always
correspond to absence from the 15th day of each spell, as well as how missing
data in these variables were handled.
The most common reasons for both sickness and disability absence were ill-
ness in locomotion organs and mental illness. Those whose capacity to work
was expected to be suﬃciently reduced for a long time could receive disabil-
ity/early retirement pension, usually preceded by a long period of sick leave
(Riksförsäkringsverket, 2004, and Law, 1962:381). During the study-period, the
compensation levels in the social insurance system ranged from 75 to 90 percent
7By 2004 there were 290 municipalities, but data from the new municipalities were aggre-
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of the income from the second day of absence, but with a cap at a certain level
of income. At ﬁrst less than 10 percent of the insured were aﬀected by this cap,
but by 2004 22 percent were (Henrekson and Persson, 2004, and the Swedish
Social Insurance Agency).
Public health care expenditure (e)w a sd e ﬁned as each county’s per capita
operating costs on health care, excluding expenditure on dental care and phar-
maceuticals. Of this roughly 2 percent was patients’ co-payments for public
health care. During the study-period total health care expenditure constituted
7.5-8.5 percent of Sweden’s GDP, of which 11-15 percent was for pharmaceuticals
and 8-10 percent for dental care. Pharmaceuticals were excluded from the study
because they were paid by the central government until 1998, and dental care
was excluded since it might have a quite diﬀerent eﬀect on absence compared
to other health care services. Public expenditure accounted for approximately
95 percent of the total non-dental, non-pharmaceutical health care expenditure
in Sweden.8 The variable (e) of course includes expenditure on the entire popu-
lation (not just those of working age), but adjustments for variations in county
age-composition were made using microdata of health care consumption. Ap-
pendix C describes how this was done in order to create a variable describing
age-adjusted per capita public health care expenditure, denoted eadj.
w is the average labor income of the non-absent population of working age
(16 to 64 years of age) in each municipality. τM and τC are the proportional
municipality and county income tax rates, respectively, and τMC is the sum of
them.
The variables Women to Pop6064 describe the shares in the population of
working age which belong to each demographic group. El.School, HighSchool
and University denote the shares of the working age population with diﬀerent
educational levels, described in Table A1 in Appendix A. SocM and SocC
denote the fraction of each municipality and county parliament, respectively,
represented by socialist parties. Finally, PolmajM and PolmajC are dummy
variables which take the value 1 if either one of the two traditional Swedish
political blocks has own majority in the municipality and county parliament,
respectively.
8These ﬁgures are the result of own calculations based on data obtained from The National
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
1994∗∗ 2004 1993-2004
Variable Mean Std.dv. Mean Std.dv. Mean Std.dv.
Sickness 10.46 1.84 15.55 3.30 13.44 4.08
Disability 29.08 8.06 31.26 7.20 28.72 7.40
Rehab 1.18 0.49 1.01 0.46 0.89 0.45
s 40.72 9.23 47.82 9.14 43.05 9.55
swomen 45.97 10.06 58.39 11.00 51.18 11.50
smen 35.97 9.02 37.88 8.20 36.03 8.44
e∗ 10.84 1.25 15.76 0.92 12.86 2.11
eadj∗ 10.68 1.02 15.56 0.81 12.72 2.04
w 159.70 18.25 215.62 23.65 186.39 29.58
τm 19.24 1.80 21.45 1.26 20.70 1.72
τc∗ 11.09 1.34 10.43 0.68 10.24 1.11
τmc 30.34 1.12 31.84 0.91 30.94 1.21
Women 0.49 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.49 0.01
Pop1639 0.50 0.02 0.45 0.04 0.47 0.04
Pop4049 0.24 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.23 0.02
Pop5054 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.01
Pop5559 0.08 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.10 0.02
Pop6064 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.01
El.School 0.33 0.06 0.25 0.04 0.30 0.06
HighSchool 0.59 0.03 0.63 0.03 0.61 0.04
University 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.05
SocM 0.51 0.12 0.47 0.11 0.48 0.12
SocC∗ 0.45 0.07 0.49 0.04 0.50 0.06
PolmajM 0.73 0.47 0.71 0.45 0.72 0.45
PolmajC∗ 0.93 0.24 0.44 0.50 0.66 0.48
∗Indicates that the variable is measured at county-level instead of municipality-level.
∗∗ Descriptive statistics are reported for 1994 since data on swomen and smen were
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3.2 Empirical speciﬁcation
The empirical speciﬁcation of the municipal absence function, i.e. equation (2),
can be written





ηlEdulit + β3hit + yt + µi + εit.( 4 )
wit(1 − τmc
it ), the net labor income in municipality i at time t, was included to
capture the monetary incentive of remaining at work for the marginal worker.
In equation (2) absence was also aﬀected by the sickness beneﬁt net of taxes, but
this was left out from the speciﬁcation since sickness beneﬁts are a function of
labor income and since observed values of it to a higher degree than the observed
values of wit depend on the composition of those on absence. Hence, a relatively
high fraction of the variation in Bit does not correspond with variation in the
monetary incentives to remain at work for the marginal worker.
The educational variables, Edulit, (l =1 ,2),w e r eu s e da sp r o x i e sf o rw o r k
conditions. These variables may also capture the eﬀect caused by that em-
ployment contracts diﬀer among diﬀerent type of jobs in respect to stipulated
number of hours and ﬂexible hours. Eﬀects of contracts have been highlighted as
major explanations to absence in previous economic literature (see e.g. Brown
and Sessions, 1996). Year-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects (yt) were included to capture
“national variables” such as business cycle eﬀects on absence. Municipality-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects (µi) were included to capture time invariant heterogeneity
among the municipalities which might be correlated with the regressors. The
other two variables, si,t−1 and hit, were motivated in the theoretical outline.
The empirical speciﬁcation of the municipal health production function, i.e.
equation (3), can be written










κnPopnit + γ3Womenit − δt,( 5 )
where hi,t−1 denotes lagged health status and eadj is age-adjusted health care
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the purpose of the other explanatory variables was to capture changes in the
health status, rather than the level of it. As such, Edulit, (l =1 ,2) were used as
proxies for the health risks that people in the municipalities are exposed to dur-
ing the year at their work place. ∆Popnit = Popnit − Popni,t−1, (n =1 ,2...4)
describe the change in the age-composition of the population in working age,
whereas Popnit, (n =1 ,2...4) and Womenit describe the demographic compo-
sition of the population in working age. The demographic variables might enter
the equation in diﬀerences since demographic groups might diﬀer in health status
and that changes in these variables therefore lead to changes in the population’s
health status. Demographic variables might enter in levels since demographic
groups might have diﬀerent development of their health status over time.9 δt
denotes depreciation of the health status and was allowed to vary over time but
not over municipalities. Not allowing the depreciation of the health status to
vary over municipalities in other ways than that captured by the demographic
and the educational variables was of course a restriction. This restriction was
imposed since health status is hard to measure and that it therefore is diﬃcult
to estimate how the depreciation depends on the level of this variable.
Diﬀerentiating equation (5) and substituting it into a diﬀerentiated version
of equation (4) yields















κnPop nit + γ3Womenit} + Yt + ∆εit,( 6 )
where Yt = yt−yt−1−β3δt. This equation, on which all empirical speciﬁcations
will be based, shows how the eﬀect of health care expenditure on absence can
be estimated without having to include proxies for health status. The new error
term, ∆εit = εit−εi,t−1, is by construction correlated with the lagged dependent
variable, ∆si,t−1 = si,t−1 − si,t−2, which is then endogenous. Also expenditure
on health care might be endogenous since, ceteris paribus, an increase in ab-
sence might cause the counties to increase it. Beyond that, a negative health
9∆WomenWAit was left out since it is has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on absence.The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 10
shock, not captured by any of the other explanatory variables of equation (6),
might cause an increase in both absence and health care expenditure. However,
the endogeneity problem is probably reduced since the dependent variable was
measured at the municipal level, whereas health care expenditure was decided
at the county level. Since county tax revenue was used to ﬁnance health care
the tax rate might also be endogenous, and if the labor income of the marginal
non-absent individual diﬀers from the average labor income of the non-absent
population, wit will be endogenous as well.
The endogeneity problem was addressed by instrumenting ∆si,t−1, eadjit
and ∆(wit(1 − τmc
it )) with the closest lags uncorrelated with the new error
term, namely ∆si,t−2, eadji,t−1,a n d∆(wi,t−2(1 − τmc
i,t−2));a n d∆PolmajM,
∆PolmajC, ∆SocM,a n d∆SocC were included as additional instruments.10,11
These four last instruments are expected to correlate with the tax and expen-
diture decisions of the municipal and county governments and were primarily
included to avoid problems with weak instruments for ∆(wi,t(1 − τmc
i,t )); but
∆PolmajC and ∆SocC c o u l da l s ob ee x p e c t e dt os t r e n g t h e nt h ei n s t r u m e n t
set for health care expenditure.12
Based on the theoretical outline it is reasonable to expect ∆(wit(1 − τmc
it ))
to have a negative impact on absence. Descriptive statistics from Sweden states
that younger and better educated individuals were less likely to be absent, which
formed my expectation about the coeﬃcients for the diﬀerenced educational and
demographic variables. During the period under study, absence has increased
much more for women than for men, more for individuals aged 50 to 59 than for
others and the absence has decrease for individuals aged 60 to 64. This formed
my expectations for the coeﬃcient for Womenit and the three highest age-
groups in levels, whereas I had no prior expectation regarding the remaining
age-group and Edulit , (l =1 ,2). Previous absence was expected to have a
positive inﬂuence on current absence, as explained in the theoretical outline.
Lastly, public health care expenditure was anticipated to have negative or no
impact on absence. As reported in the introduction, some previous research
10These instruments will be uncorrelated with the new error term if εit and εi,t−1 are
uncorrelated, which is likely since the lagged dependent variable is included in the model. εit
and εi,t−1 are correlated if ∆εit and ∆εi,t−2 are correlated, which can be tested.
11In the static speciﬁcations, ∆si,t−2 was not included.
12Similar variables were used by Aronsson et al. (2000) in a regression of municipal tax
base, but they used a Herﬁndal-Index of political fragmentation instead of ∆PolmajM and
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has reported no or very limited eﬀects of aggregated health care expenditure
on the health status of the population. Moral hazard problems is one set of
explanations to why public health care expenditure might have no, or very
limited, eﬀect on the health status of the population and therefore also on
health related work absence.
3.3 Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results for absence. All instrumental variable
estimations were done using a two-step feasible generalized method of moments
estimator, which is eﬃcient in the presence of heteroskedacity and serial corre-
lation.13 First, the baseline speciﬁcation (labeled IV) is presented where eadj,
∆si,t−1 and ∆(w(1 − τ
mc)) were instrumented and then four other speciﬁcations
are presented to serve as comparisons. In the OLS speciﬁcation all regressors
w e r et r e a t e da se x o g e n o u sa n di nt h eI V - s m a l ls p e c i ﬁcation the education and
demographic variables were left out. In the IV-e speciﬁcation e was included
instead of its age-adjusted version and the IV-static speciﬁcation is a static ver-
sion of the ﬁrst one. The omitted education- and age-groups are El.School and
Pop1639.T h ed e r i v a t i v e sds∗/deadj|ht−1 and ds∗/de|ht−1 indicate the long run
eﬀects of health care expenditure on absence. The next six statistics, which de-
scribe the relevance and validity of the instruments, are discussed in Appendix
D, where I conclude that the instruments are valid and reasonable relevant.14
13Greene (2003) describes the estimator in chapter 18.
14The estimations are based on 2,547 or 2,554 observations, since the use of lags and the ﬁrst-
diﬀerence transformation reduced the number of possible observations with 3*286, and since
27 (20 in the OLS speciﬁcation) were lost due to lack of data on health care expenditure.
To facilitate comparison, the OLS estimation was performed for the same years as the IV
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Table 2. Estimation results, ﬁrst diﬀerence of absence
IV OLS IV-small IV-e IV-static
eadj or e 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
∆st−1 0.26** 0.21*** 0.37*** 0.26**
(0.11) (0.03) (0.09) (0.11)
∆(w(1 − τ
mc)) -0.03 0.06*** -0.06 -0.03 -0.02
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
HighSchool -0.03 0.61 -0.22 0.44
(0.85) (0.82) (0.88) (0.93)
University -3.04*** -3.56*** -3.13*** -4.13***
(0.94) (0.76) (0.95) (0.91)
∆HighSchool -20.37** -20.87** -20.34** -22.30**
(9.31) (8.88) (9.28) (8.96)
∆University -48.52*** -60.11*** -48.63*** -51.91***
(14.11) (12.58) (14.08) (13.87)
Women 15.87*** 17.16*** 16.29*** 19.92***
(4.16) (3.79) (4.24) (4.24)
Pop4049 -1.65 -1.56 -1.71 -0.40
(2.70) (2.71) (2.69) (2.93)
Pop5054 -1.46 -4.34 -1.42 -2.23
(5.62) (5.57) (5.62) (5.98)
Pop5559 12.73** 12.93** 12.70** 15.67***
(5.52) (5.46) (5.51) (5.91)
Pop6064 -4.07 -4.59 -4.45 -4.77
(3.97) (3.92) (4.00) (4.46)
∆Pop4049 34.24*** 34.84*** 34.22*** 31.21***
(11.48) (11.51) (11.44) (11.99)
∆Pop5054 58.44*** 63.80*** 58.22*** 61.87***
(14.49) (14.29) (14.47) (15.34)
∆Pop5559 52.92*** 56.81*** 52.92*** 65.20***
(15.50) (14.35) (15.51) (14.98)
∆Pop6064 61.74*** 70.09*** 62.27*** 81.85***
(16.74) (15.01) (16.80) (15.97)
ds∗/deadj|ht−1 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.04
or ds∗/de|ht−1 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Cragg-Donald 22.01 29.26 22.17 42.94
eadj or e: Shea 0.72 0.81 0.63 0.74
∆st−1: Shea 0.06 0.08 0.06
∆(w(1-τmc)): Shea 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Hansen J 0.46 0.43 0.71 0.97
Serial corr. 2 0.62 0.86 0.97 0.64 0.21
Adj. R2 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.73
Sample size 2547 2554 2547 2547 2547
The regressions include year speciﬁce ﬀects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
The Asterisks ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 13
In a simultaneous test of whether eadj, ∆si,t−1 and ∆(wit(1−τmc
it )) can be
treated as exogenous, the null hypotheses of exogeneity could be rejected at the
10 percent level, which supports the use of instrumental variable estimators.15
The education and age variables in levels and in ﬁrst-diﬀerences, as well as the
year-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects were included since the null hypothesis of no eﬀect
could be rejected at the 10 percent level in group-wise F-tests. ∆Womenit
and variables describing the share of the work force in various sectors were
not included in the ﬁnal regressions since these variables had no statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀects. That ∆Womenit had no eﬀect is surprising since women in
Sweden are known to be absent more than men, but this is probably explained
by low variation in gender-composition over time. Including ∆((wit − Bs
it)(1 −
τmc
it )) instead of ∆(wit(1−τmc
it )), including lagged values of eadj, or estimating
with two-stage least squares instead of using the generalized method of moments
estimators, did not change the general results.16,17
Table 2 shows that health care expenditure had no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on absence and the estimated standard errors are small enough to rule out
all but a minimal eﬀect.18 The diﬀerence in the estimated coeﬃcients between
in the IV estimations and the OLS speciﬁcations are negligible. This might
be explained by absence being measured at the municipal level whereas health
care expenditure was decided at the county level, or by the county councils’
weak incentive to respond to changes in absence. Using unadjusted health
15The endogeneity test is based on the diﬀerence of two Hansen-Sargan statistics and is
robust against heteroscedasticity.
16Robust standard errors are reported since a Pagan-Hall test indicates heteroscedasticity
in all speciﬁcations. For the OLS speciﬁcation, a White-Koenker test was used instead.
17Previous literature (e.g. Henrekson and Persson, 2004) have found statistically signiﬁ-
cant eﬀects of current unemployment and labor force participation rates on absence. Here,
national variations in these variables were captured by the year-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, while
time-invariant heterogeneity in these variables was wiped out by the ﬁrst-diﬀerence transfor-
mation. Including these variables, or their lags, directly into the model did not change the
general results. Whether non-working individuals are unemployed, not part of the labor force,
or absent, is probably aﬀected by variables not included in the model, making labor-force
participation and unemployment endogenous. Due to this and the diﬃculty of ﬁnding strong
instruments for two additional endogenous regressors, those variables were not included in the
ﬁnal speciﬁcation.
18For the baseline speciﬁcation, the 99 percent conﬁdence interval for health care expendi-
ture reaches down to -0.07. In percentage terms a coeﬃcient of -0.07 translates to that a 10
percent increase in health care expenditure would only reduce absence by approximately 0.21
percent.The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 14
care expenditure (IV-e) instead of age-adjusted (IV and others) also made little
diﬀerence, perhaps because there was little heterogeneity in the changes in age-
composition across counties.
The eﬀect of health care expenditure on absence is of course heterogeneous
and depends on what the money is spent on. Although the purpose of this study
was to estimate the eﬀect of aggregated public health care expenditure, i.e. to
estimate the average eﬀect, such heterogeneity might cause a problem when
estimating the eﬀect with IV methods (Heckman et al., 2006). Here, the problem
would arise if the marginal expenditure identiﬁed by the instrumental variables
were non-representative in terms of their eﬀect on absence. Diﬀerent instrument
variables would then result in diﬀerent parameters being estimated. To judge
w h e t h e rt h i si sas e r i o u sp r o b l e mi nt h ep resent study, the baseline estimation
was performed with numerous combinations of instrumental variables, which all
gave similar results.19
The small eﬀect of health care expenditure on absence might be explained
partly by moral hazard problems; that is, individuals might reduce their personal
investments in health, when public health care expenditure is increased. For
example, people might exercise less and eat more unhealthy food when they
have access to better health care. These moral hazard problems can also be
one explanation to why several previous studies (see e.g. Aakvik and Holmås,
2006, or Nixon and Ulmann, 2006) have found no or limited eﬀect of health
care expenditure on the health statues of the population. It may also be that
variations in health care expenditure in industrialized countries such as Sweden
19Some instrument combinations were found to be weak or invalid (the criteria used here
were Cragg-Donald>10 and Shea>0.04 for all endogenous regressors, and Hansen J>0.10),
but 30 reasonably good combinations remained, including using changes in Herﬁndal-Indexes
of political fragmentation instead of ∆PolmajM and ∆PolmajC, and including additional
instruments such as ∆si,t−3. In one case, when eadji,t−1, ∆PolmajM, ∆PolmajC, ∆SocM
and ∆SocC, were replaced by a variable describing the counties’ ﬁnancial resources, the lag
of that variable, and a variable describing the share of Health Care Party members in the
county government in the prior year, the coeﬃcient for eadjit was negative and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, (coeﬀ.= -0.06, std.err=0.03). In the other cases the general
results held.
Since Arellano (1989) recommended using levels instead of diﬀerences as instruments for
the lagged dependent variable, si,t−2 was also tested as an instrument instead of ∆si,t−2.
However, it was found to be weak so ∆si,t−2 was used instead. The ﬁnal choice of instruments
was based on the values for the baseline speciﬁcation of the instrument statistics, discussed
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have less to do with curing and more to do with caring (Newhouse, 1977). That
is, health care expenditure on the margin might be spent so that the patients’
comforts increase but without leading to quicker recoveries. Other contributing
explanations could be migration of sick individuals to counties with higher health
care expenditure and vice versa, low eﬃciency in public health care, or perhaps
weak correlation between total health care expenditure and that directed to the
working age population, or even a weak connection between health and absence.
In all speciﬁcations lagged absence was signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level,
implying persistence. The estimated coeﬃcient is lower in the OLS speciﬁcation,
which was expected since ∆εit and ∆εi,t−1 will be negatively correlated, at least
if εit and εi,t−1 are uncorrelated.
The ﬁrst diﬀerence of average after tax labor income was only signiﬁcant in
the OLS speciﬁcation. A probable explanation to the positive estimate in that
speciﬁcation is that a reduction in absence lessens average labor income since
the marginal non-absent individual likely has a lower labor income compared
to the average in the non-absent population. If this relationship varies across
municipalities, that could also account for the non-signiﬁcant estimates in the
other speciﬁcations. The limited eﬀect of net income could also result from
this variable having opposite substitution and income eﬀects on the demand for
absence. The coeﬃcients might also be aﬀected by the impact that net income
has on absence through its eﬀect on investments in health capital.
The results indicate that university graduates had a better absence develop-
ment than others, and show that the coeﬃcients for the diﬀerenced educational
variables have the expected sign and relative size. Based on these estimates no
conclusion can be drawn whether higher education was correlated with lower
absence since those with higher education were exposed to fewer health risks at
work, had better health and health development of other reasons, or had occu-
pations that reduced their need for absence for a given health.20 Of course, these
variables might also capture characteristics that aﬀect the absence of individuals
belonging to other educational groups.
The share of women had a statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect, which was
expected since absence increased much faster for women than for men during
the study-period, partly caused by more psychological problems such as stress
20Grossman (2000) discusses possible explanations for the correlation between education
a n dh e a l t ho na ni n d i v i d u a ll e v e l .The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 16
reactions and anxiety (Riksförsäkringsverket, 2004). Those 55 to 59 was accord-
ing to the estimations, the age-group with the worst absence development. The
coeﬃcients for the diﬀerenced age variables all have the expected signs. That
the coeﬃcients for ∆Pop5559 and ∆Pop6064 are not even higher reﬂects the
lower labor force participation rate in these age-groups.
Table A2 (in Appendix A) shows that the result regarding the eﬀect of health
care expenditure prevailed when absence were estimated separately for women
and men. However, the estimates for the lagged dependent variable are not
reliable because of weak instruments, especially for men, and this might also af-
fect the other estimates in the dynamic IV speciﬁcations. The OLS estimations
provide a possible explanation for the weak instruments for men’s lagged ab-
sence, namely that the persistence in absence was relatively weak for men which
results in the second lag of the dependent variable being a weak instrument for
the ﬁrst lag.
Absence because of sickness and disability were also estimated separately
(Table E1. in Appendix E). Because of interaction between Sickness and
Disability (discussed in Appendix E), both ∆Sicknessi,t−1 and ∆Disabilityi,t−1
were instrumented with their lags and included in each estimation. The results
do not allow us to reject the null hypotheses that health care expenditure has
no eﬀect on either Sickness or Disability and the estimated standard errors are
small enough to rule out all but minimal eﬀects. However, these results must be
taken with caution since the instruments for ∆Sicknessi,t−1 are weak, and since
second-order serial correlation casts doubt on the validity of most instruments
for the dynamic IV speciﬁcations and for the static speciﬁcation for Sickness.
(However, the p-values of the Hansen J statistic suggest that the instruments
are valid for the Sickness speciﬁcations.)
4 Discussion
The eﬀect of public health care expenditure on absence due to sickness or dis-
ability in Sweden was analyzed using an instrumental variable estimator for a
dynamic panel model. Public health care expenditure was found to have no
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on absence. This result is robust against changes
in model speciﬁcation and also held when separate estimations were conducted
for women and men, and for absence due to sickness and disability. The stan-The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 17
dard errors were small enough to rule out all but a minimal eﬀect of health care
expenditure.
This result increases the likelihood that general health care is over-provided
in Sweden, according to the model by Granlund (2007). However, health care
aimed at reducing absence might still be under-provided. One possible explana-
tion of the small eﬀect on absence is that the correlation between expenditure
on health care spent on the working population and total expenditure on health
care was weak. It could also be that variation in health care expenditure had
less to do with curing and more to do with caring, meaning that health care
expenditure on the margin was spent so that the patients’ comforts increase
without leading to quicker recoveries (Newhouse, 1977). The Swedish counties
have weak incentive to reduce absence, which supports either of these expla-
nations. Due to these reasons, it should be stressed that it was the average
eﬀect of public health care expenditure on absence that was estimated, not the
maximal (or potential) eﬀect. Another set of explanation of the results is moral
hazard problems, i.e. people might reduce their personal investments in health
when public health care expenditure rises.
The paper relates to the literature studying the eﬀects of access to health
care or health care expenditure on health outcomes and the ﬁndings give no
support for that health care expenditure on an aggregated level improves the
health status of the population. However, the results from this paper might also
be explained by a weak connection between health and absence. For example,
the generous Swedish sickness insurance system might induce also the relatively
healthy to report sick. A topic for future research could thus be to investigate
the eﬀect of health care expenditure in this sample on other health measures,
e.g. on mortality rates. More research is also needed on the relationship be-
tween subcategories of health care and absence, for example, pharmaceutical
expenditure. Access to health care, measured by for example waiting times,
might also have an eﬀect on absence independent of health care expenditure in
general and thus be worthy of investigation in itself.The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 18
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Appendix A: Tables and ﬁgures
Table A1. Data deﬁnitions and data sources.
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Sickness Average number of days of absence from work due to SSIA, etc.
sickness for insured aged 16 to 64*
Disability Average number of days of absence from work due to early SSIA
retirement pension/disability for insured aged 16 to 64
Rehab Average number of days of absence from work due to SSIA
rehabilitation for insured aged 16 to 64
s Absence: sum of Sickness, Disability and Rehab* SSIA, etc.
swomen Absence for women SSIA, etc.
smen Absence for men SSIA, etc.
e Non-dental, non-pharmaceutical, public operating cost for FCC
health care, thousands of SEK** per capita
eadj Age-adjusted version of e (see Appendix C) FCC, etc.
w [Average income from work for those aged 16 to 64 SCB,SSIA
(excluding sickness and disability beneﬁts), thousands of
SEK**] / [1-absence rate], where absence rate=s/365*
(insured aged 16 to 64)/(population aged 16 to 64)
τM Proportional municipality income tax rate SCB
τC Proportional county income tax rate SCB
τMC Sum of τM and τC SCB
Women Share of women in the population aged 16 to 64 SCB
Pop1639 Share aged 16 to 39 of the population aged 16 to 64 SCB
Pop.... Pop4049-Pop6064 have corresponding deﬁnitions SCB
El.School Share of the population aged 16 to 64 who’s highest SCB
education was elementary school
HighSchool Share of the population aged 16 to 64 who’s highest SCB
education was high school or less than tree years
after high school
University Share of the population aged 16 to 64 with three years SCB
or longer education after high school
SocM Share of Social Democrats and Left Party members in SCB
municipal government
SocC Share of Social Democrats and Left Party members in SCB
county government
PolmajM Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if either of the SCB
two traditional Swedish political blocks has a majority in
the municipality government***
PolmajC Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if either of the SCB
two traditional Swedish political blocks has a majority in
the county government***
The data sources are Swedish Social Insurance Agency, SSIA, The Federation of Swedish
County Councils, FCC, and Statistics Sweden, SCB. All monetary variables are deﬂated by
CPI and expressed in 2004 years prices. *Only absence from the 15th day of each spell is
included. **On 21 December 2006, USD/SEK=6.81. ***The two political blocks consist of
the Social Democratic Party and the Left Party; and the Moderate Party, the Liberal Party,






Note: The boxes include observations from the 25th to 75th percentiles. The whiskers are 1.5
times the length of the boxes or equal the distance from the box to the minimum or maximum
values, whichever is smallest. The dots indicate outside values.








See note to Figure A1.
Figure A2. Box plot for age-adjusted health care expenditure, eadjThe Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 22
Table A2. Estimation results, ﬁrst-diﬀerence of women’s and men’s absences
Women Men
IV OLS IV-static IV OLS IV-static
eadj 0.05 0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
∆s
∗
t−1 0.08 0.19*** 0.20 0.08**
(0.12) (0.03) (0.22) (0.03)
∆(w(1 − τ
mc)) -0.04 0.07*** -0.04 -0.02 0.03** -0.01
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
HighSchool
∗ 3.26* 2.91** 3.76** -1.17 -1.18* -1.27*
(1.68) (1.45) (1.56) (0.72) (0.70) (0.76)
University
∗ -4.47*** -4.66*** -4.77*** -0.47 -1.04* -0.76
(1.13) (0.99) (1.12) (0.66) (0.54) (0.59)
∆HighSchool
∗ -16.81 -18.62* -17.20* -7.91 -8.11 -11.10
(10.40) (10.31) (10.45) (8.19) (7.29) (7.36)
∆University
∗ -12.74 -28.09* -12.32 -47.24*** -55.13*** -54.77***
(16.89) (15.17) (16.87) (14.44) (11.01) (11.85)
Pop4049∗ -0.23 -1.19 0.13 -4.34* -4.02 -4.15
(3.68) (3.51) (3.78) (2.49) (2.55) (2.61)
Pop5054∗ -3.94 -5.68 -3.91 5.23 4.34 5.63
(5.85) (5.59) (6.05) (4.53) (4.53) (4.61)
Pop5559∗ 28.26*** 24.56*** 30.16*** 0.83 0.39 0.20
(6.39) (5.79) (6.29) (4.69) (4.64) (4.68)
Pop6064∗ -11.14** -11.60** -11.70** 0.47 -0.34 1.53
(5.40) (5.00) (5.66) (3.94) (3.97) (4.06)
∆Pop4049∗ 24.63* 27.43** 24.23* 30.76*** 28.39*** 28.36***
(13.53) (13.50) (13.76) (9.91) (9.71) (9.75)
∆Pop5054∗ 50.42*** 52.40*** 52.67*** 29.39** 29.53** 26.76**
(16.58) (16.38) (16.90) (12.60) (12.08) (12.26)
∆Pop5559∗ 44.81** 46.97*** 48.40*** 32.29** 38.13*** 40.60***
(17.92) (17.38) (17.93) (14.90) (12.01) (12.16)
∆Pop6064∗ 80.05*** 80.77*** 85.63*** 62.84*** 72.70*** 75.11***




ht−1 0.06 0.07 -0.05 -0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Cragg-Donald 14.54 42.33 6.02 44.81
eadj or e: Shea 0.72 0.74 0.75 0.75
∆s
∗
t−1: Shea 0.04 0.02
∆(w(1-τmc)):Shea 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11
Hansen J 0.88 0.93 0.90 0.80
Serial corr. 2 0.18 0.94 0.25 0.31 0.26 0.34
Adj. R2 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.62 0.63 0.63
Sample size 2261 2268 2261 2261 2268 2261
∗ indicates that the variable is gender-speciﬁc. Also, see notes to Table 2.The Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 23
Appendix B: Missing data and changes in the ab-
sence variables
Data on the absence variables were missing for some of the municipalities in
1997, 1998 and 1999. Instead, aggregated data were reported for two (or some-
times three or four) municipalities in the same county. For six municipalities,
data for all three years were missing, and instead the aggregated data for three
pairs of municipalities were reported. For 37 municipalities, data for 1998 and
1999 were missing, and instead the aggregated data for 12 pairs of municipalities,
and three groups of three, and one group of four municipalities were reported.
For seven municipalities, data for 1999 were missing, and instead the aggregated
data for one group of three and one group of four municipalities were reported.
Thus in total, 99 observations lacked data on the absence variables.
The absolute number of days of absence (days) as well the number of insured
for each group of municipalities is known. I assumed that the days were divided
among the municipalities in each group in proportion to their share of days





where i indicates the ith municipality and p indicates the group of municipalities
to which it belongs. B indicates the last year before, T the ﬁrst year after, and
M the years of missing data. This assumption was suﬃcient to get an estimate
of days for each municipality for which data were missing for only one year.
The estimated days was then divided by the number of insured, estimated in
the same way, to obtain an estimate of s for each municipality.
Using the maximum entropy method (Wilson, 1970), days for those lacking





The number of insured was estimated in the same way, and then an estimate of s
was calculated for each municipality each year. Sickness, Disability,a n dRehab
were each estimated in this way, which is the least biased estimate possible with
the information given (Jaynes, 1957).
For 1999, data on the absence variables were missing, and instead data for
October 1998 to September 1999 were reported. I used the numbers reportedThe Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 24
inﬂated with 1/8 of the change from 1998 to 2000, which assumes that changes
for the fourth quarter were of the same magnitude as the average change for the
other three quarters from 1998 to 2000, and that half of this change occurred
each year.
Estimations excluding the observations with missing data, and using the
average of the values for 1998 and 2000 instead of the calculated values for
1999, give the same general results for the baseline speciﬁcation.
As mentioned earlier, the absence variables include only days compensated
by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency, not days compensated by employers.
During 1992-1996 and April 1998-June 2003 employees were compensated by
the employer for the ﬁrst 14 days of absence; during January 1997-March 1998
for the ﬁrst 28 days; and during July 2003-December 2004 for the ﬁrst 21 days.21
Following Henrekson and Persson (2004), this was addressed using data from
The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise.
Their data cover a reasonably representative sample of 2,500 private sector
establishments and 220,000 employees. Absence from work due to sickness was
categorized by the length of the absence spells and separate ﬁgures were reported
for nine Swedish regions.22 Assuming that the absence pattern was the same
for all municipalities belonging to the same region, and the same for the public
sector as for the private sector, the original data for Sickness (and s)w e r e
adjusted to give absences from the 15th day of absence for all years. This
was done by multiplying the original Sickness-variable by the percentage of
work time lost due to sickness absence from the 15th day of absence divided
by the percentage of work time lost due to sickness that was covered by the
Swedish Social Insurance Agency.23,24 The variable s was then created by adding
21The self-employed were allowed to choose among insurance plans which diﬀered in when
they began to reimburse for lost income due to sickness. One plan stipulated that the self-
employed were reimbursed ﬁrst from the 31st day, but this should have a small eﬀect, if any,
on the estimations.
22The data for 1997 and 1998 were published in SAF (1998) and SAF (1999), respectively.
Data for 2003 and 2004 were provided directly by the company, Löneanalyser AB.
23From the data it is not possible to directly identify the shares of work-hours lost due to
absence during days 15 to 21; instead the shares for days 15 to 20 are reported, which were
multiplied by 7/6. Unfortunately this causes a slight overestimation of absence for the years
2003 and 2004, because of less absence the 21st day compared to the average for days 15-20.
The absence patterns for the ﬁrst and second halves of 2003 were assumed identical in order
to adjust the data.
24For 1997 Sickness was multiplied by a factor ranging from 1.12 to 1.23 depending on theThe Eﬀect of Health Care Expenditure on Sickness Absence 25
Disability and Rehab to the adjusted version of Sickness. swomen and smen
were created similarly. Table 1 reports adjusted versions of these variables.
Appendix C: Age-adjustment of health care ex-
penditure
The age-adjustment was based on an index of age dependent health care con-
sumption produced by Statistics Sweden, which was used to calculate intergov-
ernmental equalization grants for counties until 1995.25
For somatic short-term health care, psychiatric care, and geriatric care, the
national average of treatment days for the age-groups 0-14, 15-44, 45-64, 65-79
and 80- were provided each year by the National Board on Health and Welfare.
The average number of physician consultations in primary health care and
hospital connected health care were provided by the County Council of Skåne
for 1991-1993 (covering only the county of Malmöhus, which became a part of
Skåne in 1998) and for 2001-2004. To avoid regional diﬀerences, only data from
former Malmöhus were used for the last period as well. These sources were used
since no national ﬁgures were available. For 1991-1993 the data were reported
for the same ﬁve age-groups as above, but for 2001-2004 eight age-groups were
used: 0-4, 5-14, 15-24, 25-44, 45-64, 65-74, 75-84, and 85-. Based on this data,
percentage changes each year were estimated for the two consultations types for
the age-groups 0-14, 15-44, 45-64, and 65-. Then the number of consultations in
each of the eight age-groups were calculated for 1993-2000 using the estimated
percentage changes for the group 0-14 for the age-groups 0-4 and 5-14, etc.
Using these ﬁgures and population data, the expected number of treatment
days and physician consultations per inhabitant were calculated for each county,
each year, for each type of health care. These numbers were then divided by
the national average to obtain indexes, which were aggregated using each health
care category’s national cost-share each year as weight. The cost-shares were
region. The corresponding ﬁgures for 1998, 2003, and 2004 are 1.03 to 1.05; 1.01 to 1.04; and
1.01 to 1.07, respectively. For all other years the factor was of course 1.
25Two other methods have been used by Statistics Sweden since 1995, the ﬁrst based on a
regression of health care expenditure on a number of macro-variables. This method was not
used here since it can capture not only diﬀerences in need for health care but also diﬀerences
in preference and resources. The second method was not used here since it depends on the
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calculated from data obtained from Statistics Sweden for the years 1993-2003.
The average cost-shares were; somatic short-term health care (0.5); psychi-
atric care (0.08); geriatric care (0.05); physician consultations in primary health
care (0.19) and physician consultations in hospital connected health care (0.18).
These ﬁve categories accounted for approximately 95 percent of non-dental non-
pharmaceutical health care consumption. Finally, age-adjusted health care ex-
penditure (eadj) was calculated by dividing health care expenditure (e)w i t h
the appropriate index for each observation.
Appendix D: Relevance and validity of the instru-
ments
Table 2 reports the Cragg-Donald weak identiﬁcation statistic, which is the
smallest eigenvalue of the matrix analog to the F-statistic from the ﬁrst-stage
regressions. Since the models include several endogenous variables, this statistic
is reported instead of the F-statistic. Based on the tabulation by Stock and Yogo
(2005) of critical values for the Cragg-Donald weak identiﬁcation statistic, the
instrument is judged to be strong if the statistic is above 13.95 in the dynamic
or 15.72 in the static speciﬁcation.26 The statistic is well above these values in
all speciﬁcations.
As a complement to this test, Shea’s (1997) partial R-squared measure of
instrument relevance for models with multiple endogenous variables is reported.
Shea did not provide any critical values, but mentioned 0.05 as an example
when the instrument set is not very relevant for an endogenous regressor, and
noted that low relevance increases asymptotic standard errors and increases the
inconsistency of the estimates whenever instruments are not perfectly exoge-
nous. The Shea values in Table 2 are above 0.05 for all endogenous regressors,
especially for eadj, but are quite close (0.06) for ∆st−1 in two speciﬁcations.
Together the Cragg-Donald and Shea statistics indicate that the instruments
26The critical values used are those for a maximum bias of 0.05 relative to OLS for a two-
stage least squares (TSLS) estimator. No critical values are provided for a general means of
moments (GMM) estimator, and these values are only approximate for the GMM estimator,
since it diverges somewhat from the TSLS estimator because of heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation. But at least the test indicates strong instruments for the TSLS estimator, which,
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are, at least, reasonably relevant for all the endogenous regressors.
The Hansen J statistic is the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions, where the joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid,
i.e., uncorrelated with the error term. This test is consistent in the presence
of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, and supports the exogeneity of the
instruments used.
Serial corr. 2 reports the p-value of a t-test of serial correlation of the
second order. This test was conducted since the exogeneity assumptions for
two of the four instruments were based on the assumption of no second-order
serial correlation. The test can be viewed as complementary to the Hansen
J test, which would also indicate that the instruments were invalid if second-
order serial correlation were too strong. For all speciﬁcations, no statistically
signiﬁcant second-order serial correlation was found. Thus, both Hansen J and
the Serial corr. 2 test support the assumption that the instruments are valid
for all speciﬁcations reported in Table 2.
Appendix E: Sickness and disability
The basic transitions between the three mutually exclusive states that an indi-
v i d u a lc a no c c u p ya r ei l l u s t r a t e di nF i g u r eE 1 . 27 The illustrated ﬂows are those
that are driven by other factors than economic incentives, health status and
work characteristics. The vertical arrows illustrate the eﬀects of habit forma-
tion. The diagonal arrow from Sicknesst−1 to Disabilityt illustrates the ﬂow
caused by information increasing over time regarding the expected duration of
individual’s reduced work capacity. That is, this arrow shows the ﬂow between
the two states caused by better predictions about the individual’s future work
capacity, conditioned on the observed present one.
The ﬂow from Workt−1 to Sicknesst illustrates the inﬂow to absence that
is aﬀected by previous absence in the municipality, through its eﬀect on the
disutility of absence.28 One possibility is that this habit formation is not speciﬁc
27Rehab is of minor importance (Table 1) so no separate analysis was done with it as
dependent variable.
28It is less likely that there is a direct ﬂow from work to disability of this reason and no
such arrow is therefore drawn. It is however possible, that for example individuals with long-
lasting small reduction in work capacity go directly from work to disability, as a consequence
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to the type of non-work state. For example, a high rate of people on disability
pension in a municipality might also reduce the social cost of being on sick
leave, resulting in a correlation between Disabilityt−1 and Sicknesst,e v e ni fn o
one actually moved in this direction, simply because a high rate of Disability
caused a ﬂow from Workto Sickness. Table E1 presents the estimation results
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Table E1. Estimation results, ﬁrst diﬀerence of Sickness & Disability
Sickness Disability
IV OLS IV-static IV OLS IV-static
eadj 0.05 0.04* 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
∆Sick.t−1 -0.23 0.10*** 0.53*** 0.05**
(0.16) (0.03) (0.13) (0.02)
∆Dis.t−1 -0.22** -0.10*** 0.47*** 0.34***
(0.11) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03)
∆(w(1 − τ
mc)) -0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.06*** 0.03
(0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
HighSchool 1.62* 1.07 1.14 -1.53** -0.33 -0.57
(0.90) (0.72) (0.77) (0.73) (0.63) (0.74)
University -0.87 -0.46 0.10 -1.90** -3.08*** -4.15***
(1.00) (0.70) (0.76) (0.83) (0.61) (0.72)
∆HighSchool 3.83 5.09 5.90 -17.05** -20.64*** -22.68***
(8.14) (8.01) (7.99) (7.50) (6.99) (6.87)
∆University -20.13 -22.48* -15.84 -19.93* -31.62*** -31.14***
(12.75) (11.51) (11.98) (11.77) (9.62) (10.49)
Women 10.17** 8.51** 6.72* 5.24 7.62*** 12.47***
(4.43) (3.44) (3.60) (3.47) (2.86) (3.31)
Pop4049 1.09 -0.66 -0.32 -2.71 -0.96 -0.40
(3.00) (2.58) (2.72) (2.27) (1.99) (2.24)
Pop5054 -4.99 -3.15 -3.12 2.24 -1.25 -0.02
(6.10) (5.07) (5.45) (5.21) (4.19) (4.63)
Pop5559 14.04** 10.22** 11.54** 0.86 2.79 4.78
(5.89) (5.19) (5.37) (4.93) (4.38) (4.88)
Pop6064 0.01 -0.87 -0.01 -5.91* -3.54 -5.40
(4.61) (3.96) (4.06) (3.54) (3.13) (3.48)
∆Pop4049 13.38 17.93* 17.22 21.35** 15.54* 13.44
(11.98) (10.49) (10.86) (10.57) (9.04) (9.41)
∆Pop5054 36.49** 33.00** 32.47** 20.56* 25.87** 27.57**
(14.61) (13.05) (13.42) (11.96) (10.70) (11.50)
∆Pop5559 35.74** 24.99* 24.56* 19.53 32.26*** 40.99***
(15.92) (13.99) (13.97) (13.72) (11.63) (11.79)
∆Pop6064 20.10 9.19 2.28 42.71*** 58.25*** 77.57***
(17.39) (14.31) (14.31) (14.05) (11.12) (11.87)
ds∗/deadj|x o
ht−1 0.04 0.05* -0.07 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
Cragg-Donald 9.92 42.94 9.92 42.94
eadj or e: Shea 0.69 0.74 0.69 0.74
∆Sick.t−1:Shea 0.03 0.03
∆Dis.t−1:Shea 0.09 0.09
∆(w(1-τmc)):Shea 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Hansen J 0.27 0.37 0.00 0.44
Serial corr. 2 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.52
Adj. R2 0.59 0.62 0.61 0.70 0.77 0.74
Sample size 2547 2554 2547 2547 2554 2547
x o ds∗/deadj|ht−1 states the long run eﬀect of eadj on Sickness and Disability, respectively
excluding the eﬀect that goes through the other variable. Also, see notes in Table 2.